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Consider the following hypothetical scenario: A provincial hospital 
purchases two state-of-the-art oncology machines that can each 
treat 100 patients a day. The purchase includes a 5-year service 
contract to ensure that the machines operate properly. At the end 
of the 5-year service contract, the Member of the Executive Council 
(MEC) for Health refuses to renew the contract – despite the fact 
that no other person or body in the country is qualified to service 
the machines. The machines run down and are no longer able to 
service cancer patients at the provincial hospital. Hundreds of cancer 
patients, who in the past would have been treated with the two 
hospital oncology machines within 2 weeks of being diagnosed, 
now have to wait for 9 months for treatment. As a result, their cancer 
progresses from treatable to terminal, and they die. The hospital’s 
oncology staff leave because they can no longer treat cancer patients 
ethically and effectively, as they lack the necessary equipment. The 
problem is brought to the attention of the MEC and head of the 
health department on numerous occasions. They do not renew the 
service contract at ZAR400 000 a month with the authorised service 
providers to fix the oncology machines so that the hospital can treat 
200 patients a day. Instead, the MEC and his colleagues approve a 
contract with a recently qualified oncology ex-department of health 
(DoH) employee to treat 50 cancer patients a month at a cost of 
ZAR2 million a month. The authorised service providers offer to fix 
the machines for ZAR2.5 million. Despite this offer, the MEC and his 
colleagues award the ex-employee’s recently formed company with 
a contract to fix the machines at ZAR5.8 million. In addition, the 
MEC and his colleagues award the same company a service contract 
to service the hospital’s two oncology machines at ZAR400  000 a 
month –  even though it does not have the qualifications to do so. 
The ex-employee is unable to carry out the service contract, and the 
oncology machines remain inoperative. Scores of patients continue 
to die as a result of having to wait months for treatment, by which 
time their cancer is terminal. Despite public utterances by the MEC 
and his colleagues to the contrary, and their call to the public to get 
early treatment for cancer, the machines continue to be inoperative.
The above hypothetical scenario begs the question as to whether 
the MEC for Health, the head of the provincial health department 
and any other public health officials involved in the cancellation of 
the service contract for the hospital’s oncology machines – without 
providing a workable substitute – can be held criminally responsible 
for the deaths of the cancer patients.
It has been suggested that MECs for health, heads of health 
departments and other responsible public health officials involved 
in situations similar to those in the above scenario could be held 
civilly liable for any harm resulting from their conduct.[1] Apart from 
any criminal liability arising from breaches of the Public Finance 
Management Act No. 1 of 1999,[2] the question arises whether 
the MEC and his colleagues in the hypothetical scenario may be 
held criminally liable for homicide. To answer this, it is necessary 
to consider if the MEC and public officials may be found guilty of 
murder, and if not, whether they can be found guilty of culpable 
homicide. 
May the MEC for Health and other public 
health officials in the hypothetical 
scenario be found guilty of murder?
Murder is the intentional and unlawful killing of another human 
being.[3] The elements of the murder that have to be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt in all cases are that: (i) the accused person had 
the intention to kill; (ii) the person’s act or omission was unlawful; 
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(iii) the person caused the death of the other person; and (iv) the 
other person killed was a human being.[3] The last is usually not 
in contention – and in the above hypothetical scenario it will be 
necessary to identify those patients who have died as a result 
of having their cancer treatment delayed because the oncology 
machines were not working. 
Intention
The element of ‘intention’ in murder may take the form of either 
‘actual intention’ or ‘eventual intention’. Where a person directs their 
will to kill a particular person and knows that their act or omission 
is unlawful, he or she is guilty of ‘actual intention’.[4] Where he or 
she does not mean to kill a person, but subjectively foresees the 
possibility that a person may die as a result of their act or omission 
and continues with such conduct regardless, he or she is guilty of 
‘eventual intention’.[4] This  happened in the Oscar Pistorius case,[5] 
where the court held that Pistorius must have subjectively foreseen 
that if he fired shots into a small bathroom and toilet where 
somebody was hiding he might kill the person. As a result, he was 
found to have had the ‘eventual intention’ to kill his girlfriend who 
was hiding there.[5] 
The question arises as to whether, in the above hypothetical 
scenario, the MEC for Health, the head of the provincial DoH and any 
other public health officials involved in the decision not to renew the 
oncology-machine service contract with the qualified service provider 
had the ‘actual’ or ‘eventual intention’ to allow the cancer patients to 
die. It is self-evident that they did not have the ‘actual intention’ to kill 
the patients, as this would clearly result in a murder charge. However, 
did they have the ‘eventual intention’ to do so? Did they subjectively 
foresee that by not renewing the service contracts, the machines would 
not function, and up to 200 patients a day in the hospital concerned 
might be left without treatment – unless alternative arrangements 
were made? Once they knew that there were no viable alternatives, 
and that the waiting period for patients in urgent need of oncology 
treatment had increased from a manageable 2 weeks to a fatal 9 
months, there was a legal duty on them to act expeditiously to have the 
machines repaired. According to the scenario, they were warned, and 
must have subjectively foreseen, that such a lengthy waiting period 
would result in the deaths of the patients concerned. Therefore, legally, 
they had the ‘eventual intention’ to let the patients die.
Unlawfulness
Whether or not the conduct of a person accused of murder is unlawful 
will depend upon the legal convictions of the community,[6] as informed 
by the provisions of the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution.
[7] The Bill of Rights is clear that everyone should have access to 
healthcare services (section 27(1)(a)) and that the state must ‘take 
reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources 
to achieve the progressive realisation’ of this right (section 27(2)). 
Furthermore, children have the right to ‘basic healthcare services’ 
(section 28(1)(c)) – not merely access to such services. In addition, 
everyone has the right to life (section 11). Clearly, any breach of these 
provisions that results in the death of patients is unlawful.
The question is whether, in terms of the above hypothetical scenario, 
the MEC for Health, the head of the provincial DoH and any other 
public health officials involved in the decision not to renew the 
oncology-machine service contracts with the qualified service provider 
acted unlawfully. From the scenario, it is clear that the state officials 
could not argue that they did not have the ‘available resources’ to get 
the authorised service provider to fix the machines and to enter into 
service agreements with them. On the contrary, such officials have 
squandered the provincial DoH’s financial resources by: (i) paying the 
ex-employee twice as much to fix the machines as the authorised 
service providers would charge – ZAR5.8 million instead of ZAR2.5 
million; and (ii) by paying the ex-employee ZAR2 million a month to 
treat 50 patients monthly, or 600 patients a year for ZAR24 million. The 
two hospital oncology machines could have treated 600 patients in 3 
months at a cost of ZAR400 000 a month for a total of ZAR1.2 million. 
Consequently, there is no doubt that legally, the conduct of the state 
officials mentioned in the scenario was unlawful.
Causation
The last question to be answered for criminal liability in a murder 
charge is whether the conduct of the accused person caused or 
contributed to the death of the deceased person.[8] In law, the 
alleged murderer must have both factually and legally have caused 
or contributed to the death of the deceased. The test for factual 
causation is whether ‘but for’ the act or omission of the accused 
person the deceased would not have died.[9] In the hypothetical 
scenario the question would be: Can it be said that ‘but for’ the failure 
of the MEC for Health and his colleagues to renew the service contract 
with the authorised service provider and to keep the two oncology 
machines operational, scores of patients would not have progressed 
from treatable cancer to terminal cancer and died? If the answer is 
in the affirmative – as it must be in the hypothetical scenario – the 
element of factual causation is satisfied.
The next question is whether the MEC for Health, the provincial 
head of health or other public health officials involved legally caused 
the death of the deceased. The traditional tests for legal causation 
were the foreseeability test,[10] the direct-consequence test[11] and 
the adequate-cause test.[12] The foreseeability test provides that if 
a person would have reasonably foreseen the likelihood of death 
resulting from their act or omission and persisted with such conduct, 
the accused person is regarded as having legally caused the death 
of the person.[10] The direct-consequence test states that a person 
is liable for the direct consequences of their act or omission unless 
some new act intervened between such act or omission and the 
death of the deceased.[11] According to the adequate-cause test, a 
person has caused the death of another if such death is ‘adequately 
connected’ to the act or omission of the accused person.[12]  
The above three tests are now regarded as ‘subsidiary tests’,[13] and 
the courts apply a ‘flexible approach’ based on policy considerations 
such as whether it would be reasonable, fair or just to regard the 
consequences of a person’s conduct as not being too remote.[13] On 
this basis, the courts determine ‘whether or not a sufficiently close 
connection exists between conduct and its consequences’.[13] The 
‘subsidiary tests’ may be used to assist the court in making such a 
determination, but are not in themselves decisive.[13]  Whether one 
applies the three ‘subsidiary tests’ or the flexible test, it seems that in 
the hypothetical scenario the MEC for Health and his colleagues can 
be said to have legally caused the deaths of the deceased patients, for 
the reasons set out below.
Under the foreseeability test, a reasonable person in the position of 
the MEC and his colleagues would have foreseen that early-stage 
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cancer patients who had to wait 9 months – instead of 2 weeks – for 
oncology treatment, because the two machines at the hospital were 
non-operational, might progress from treatable to terminal cancer 
and die. Similarly, it can be said that the deaths of the patients 
in these circumstances were a direct consequence of the service 
contracts not being renewed and no alternative treatment being 
available. There is also an ‘adequate connection’ between the failure 
to renew the service contracts and the deaths of the patients from 
terminal cancer. Finally, under the ‘flexible approach’ it would be 
reasonable, fair and just to find that there was a ‘sufficiently close 
connection’ between the omission by the MEC for Health, the 
provincial head of health or any other public health official to renew 
the service contracts with an authorised service provider, and the 
resulting deaths.
May the MEC for Health and other public 
health officials in the hypothetical 
scenario be found guilty of culpable 
homicide?
The question arises as to whether if the NPA declines to indict the 
MEC for Health, provincial head of health or any other public health 
official for murder, based on their eventual intention to cause the 
deaths of the cancer patients, such officials may be charged with 
culpable homicide for negligently causing the deaths of the patients. 
The crime of culpable homicide consists of negligently and unlawfully 
causing the death of another person.[14] Except for the requirements 
of negligence, which are objectively based on conduct – rather than 
the accused person’s subjective state of mind – the other elements 
of unlawfulness, causation and the death of a human being are the 
same, and will not be repeated. 
Negligence
As mentioned above, negligence deals with a person’s conduct 
rather than their state of mind. The test for liability in negligence 
cases is objective, not subjective. According to the common law, a 
person is negligent if a reasonable person in their position would 
have foreseen the likelihood of harm and taken steps to prevent it 
happening.[15]  The test for negligence in this case would be: Would 
a reasonable official in the position of the MEC for Health, provincial 
head of health or other public health officials involved, have foreseen 
that by failing to renew the service contracts for the oncology 
machines at the hospital, such failure might result in the machines 
not functioning, and that as a result scores of cancer patients would 
be denied access to oncology services? 
The answer must be in the affirmative. A reasonable person 
in the position of the MEC and his colleagues as reflected in the 
hypothetical scenario would have foreseen that if such patients were 
compelled to wait for 9 months instead of 2 weeks to receive the 
necessary treatment for early-stage cancer – because no alternative 
services are available – this might result in them progressing from 
curable to incurable terminal cancer by the time they are scheduled 
for treatment. There is little doubt that the conduct of the MEC for 
Health, the provincial head of health or other public health officials 
referred to in the scenario was negligent, and could result in them 
being convicted of culpable homicide.
Conclusion
Provided the other elements of the crime of murder are present, 
MECs for health, provincial heads of health or other public health 
officials who allow cancer patients to die because of a failure 
to renew service contracts for hospital oncology machines – 
without providing a viable alternative – may be found guilty 
of having the ‘eventual intention’ to cause such deaths, and 
convicted of murder.
Where such MECs and their colleagues are not charged with 
murder, they could still be charged with culpable homicide – if it 
can be shown that reasonable officials in their position would have 
foreseen that failure to renew service contracts for the oncology 
machines at a hospital might deprive scores of cancer patients of 
access to oncology services and result in their deaths.
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